Central bank money is the foundation of modern monetary and payment systems.
at the bank become the de facto means of final settlement. In the end, the final step into the world of fiat money-the elimination of the right to withdraw funds from the Bank of Amsterdam-was a quiet formalization of a successful, informal norm of behavior.
I. Debasement
Around 1600, the Dutch Republic was a small open economy with 800 to 1,000 different circulating coins: each province and many cities had official mints while private mints, neighboring states and counterfeiters offered competing coins (Pit Dehing and Marjolein t' Hart 1997, 40) . The competition created what Adam Smith (2000, 510) called the "small state" problem of incremental debasement, for mints would attract business by offering light versions of standard coins. For example, in 1607, Republic officials determined that the province of West-Friesland was engaging in debasement of the silver rixdollar while the province of Holland was not, and, at the same time, West-Friesland was minting 16 times Holland's volume of rixdollars. (M.S. Polak 1998, 103-68 
II. Two Units of Account
Another result of the ongoing debasement was that the market price of old, heavy coins, like rixdollars, rose above their ordinance values to reflect the difference in metal content relative to new, light coins. This was not a problem for the Bank of Amsterdam, for the bank treated incoming patagons as bullion, so depositing them was not profitable.
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Also, the rising market price of rixdollars meant that deposits maintained their purchasing power upon withdrawal. For Dutch authorities, however, the situation was frustrating. Mint ordinances were supposed to set the price of coins, yet the market prices of circulating coins rose, and coins like patagons circulated with no regulated value. To correct these perceived imperfections, authorities began a series of new mint ordinances. At first, in 1619, authorities simply raised the legal value of rixdollars, so its production and debasement surged. Figure 1 displays the surge in rixdollar production (measured as legitimate seigniorage) and debasement penalties for five Dutch provincial mints (Quinn and Roberds 2006, 25) . In 1622, authorities added an official price to the invading patagons, and the unintended consequence was that rixdollar production declined. Why? Because the patagon's ordinance value was set high enough to end the incentive to melt patagons in order to mint rixdollars.
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After 1622, continuing debasement again caused the market price of coins to grow higher than their official price, so authorities raised the price of patagons in 1638 to realign ma rket and ordinance prices. Now the patagon's official value was so high that it paid to melt rixdollars, if you could get them at the official price. Returning to Figure 1 , rixdollar production ceases, and the coin, "completely disappeared from circulation to be exclusively used as commercial coins for export (van Dillen 1934, 88) ." Unfortunately, the only entities obliged to supply rixdollars at ordinance prices were exchange banks, and arbitrage soon compelled the Bank of Amsterdam to switch to giving out patagons to cover withdrawals. The change was a default that violated the bank's primary obligation to defend creditors.
In the early 1640s, debasement again had the market prices of coins on the rise, so the patagon's ordinance price at the Bank of Amsterdam became lower than its price in circulation. This time, authorities grudgingly tolerated the mismatched prices. In the gap, a market exchange rate emerged between the unit of account within the bank (banco florin) and unit of account outside the bank (current florin). This exchange rate was called the agio, and it mediated flows between the intra-bank payment system and the outside payment system, despite both systems relying on the same coin (Larry Neal 2000, 121-2).
A reason the dual regime was tolerated was that the conquest of the Dutch Republic by foreign coins was seen as a greater problem, and in, 1659, the Dutch Republic finally introduced new, domestic coins to replace the foreign ones. To ease adoption of the new coins, the dual unit of account system was officially recognized. For example, the new Dutch dukaat was worth 2.4 florin inside the bank and 2.5 florin outside, just like the patagon that the dukaat sought to replace. In 1609, mandating two prices for the same 6 Dutch coin would have been an outrageous proposition, but the peculiar state of the monetary system fifty years later meant that formal retention of two units of account was a conservative, reassuring measure.
III. Demand for Withdrawals
In contrast to the tumult leading to two official units of account, the final steps to a fiat medium of exchange were increasingly placid. As of 1659, the Amsterdam Exchange Bank formally supplied in-bank settlement of large value transactions in its own unit of account, but deposits still had a right of withdrawal. In everyday practice, ho wever, the right was becoming rarely exercised, and the events of the next 25 years further reduced the relevance of withdrawal.
To start, a market formed daily in front of the bank where dealers like cashiers sold deposits at the agio exchange rate rather than pay a fee to make a withdrawal. This market-the first "open market" in central bank funds-was tested in 1672-3 when a
French invasion touched off a run that reduced the total florin value of deposits by 47 percent over two years. The Bank weathered the episode and so bolstered its credibility.
In 1683, the exchange bank further reduced demand for withdrawals by accommodating dealers in coin with a deposit service. When coin was deposited, the depositor was given the bullion value of the metal on account plus a receipt for the specific coins deposited; a receipt entitled its holder to repurchase the metal at a fixed price, if he so desired. The receipts (effectively European options on Bank funds) were easily saleable, so a metallic withdrawal could be arranged this way. The receipt system also segregated metal with a 7 high expectation of withdrawal and easily transferred that metal to customers desiring a wit hdrawal.
In this environment, sometime in the 1680s, the Amsterdam Exchange Bank 
